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We consider the security of continuous-variable quantum cryptography as we approach the classical-limit,
i.e., when the unknown preparation noise at the sender’s station becomes significantly noisy or thermal (even
by as much as 104 times greater than the variance of the vacuum mode). We show that, provided the channel
transmission losses do not exceed 50%, the security of quantum cryptography is not dependent on the channel
transmission, and is therefore, incredibly robust against significant amounts of excess preparation noise. We
extend these results to consider for the first time quantum cryptography at wavelengths considerably longer than
optical and find that regions of security still exist all the way down to the microwave.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.-p, 89.70.Cf
Introduction - Quantum key distribution (QKD) using con-
tinuous variables (CV) [1, 2] allows two people, Alice and
Bob, to generate a secure key which can be used to encrypt
messages. CV-QKD protocols using Gaussian modulation [3–
8], initially begin with Alice preparing a number of randomly
displaced pure coherent states and sending them over an in-
secure quantum channel to Bob. Generally, it is assumed that
Alice’s states must be pure quantum states to a good approx-
imation otherwise her ability to perform QKD will rapidly
become compromised. This seemed to be borne out by re-
cent calculations [9] that showed that the distance over which
CV-QKD was secure, when Alice used mixed coherent states
in the protocol, fell rapidly as the states became significantly
impure.
In this Letter, we show that, provided the channel trans-
mission losses do not exceed 50 %, the security of quantum
cryptography is not dependent on the channel transmission,
and is therefore incredibly robust against significant levels of
impurity of Alice’s states, without the additional previous re-
quirement of purifiers [9]. This is a remarkable result as we
might naturally expect that as Alice’s states become more and
more thermalized secure transmission over any finite distance
would become impossible. This further motivates an investi-
gation of the security of CV-QKD as we move from optical
frequencies into the infrared and down into the microwave re-
gion. As the wavelength gets longer there is no direct way of
detecting single photons [10] thus ruling out discrete variable
approaches. While CV measurements still apply, state prepa-
ration and the quantum channel become thermalized by the
significant levels of background radiation that exist for longer
wavelengths at room temperature. Here we show that CV-
QKD remains, in principle, possible over short distances, well
into the infrared and into the microwave regime. This surpris-
ing result highlights the possibility of short-range quantum
cryptography applications at sub-optical frequencies.
Quantum Cryptography using Gaussian States - Typical
Gaussian modulated CV-QKD protocols, begin with Alice
randomly modulating a vacuum state to create a coherent
state |α〉 [11]. This random modulation or displacement
α = QA + iPA contains two independent variables XS ∈
{QA, PA} chosen from a two-dimensional Gaussian distribu-
tion with variance VS and zero mean. It is these continuous
variables that will ultimately be used to construct a secret key
between Alice and Bob. Alice then sends a whole ensemble
of these randomly displaced pure coherent states to Bob over
a quantum channel which is monitored by the eavesdropper,
Eve. At the output of the channel, Bob measures the incoming
states using either homodyne [4] or heterodyne detection [5].
The initial modes prepared by Alice can be described in
the Heisenberg picture as XˆA = XS + Xˆ0 where XS de-
scribes the classical signal and Xˆ0 the thermal mode. Here
the quadratures Qˆ and Pˆ are defined as: XˆA ∈ {QˆA, PˆA}
and Xˆ0 ∈ {Qˆ0, Pˆ0}. The overall variance V := V (XˆA) of
Alice’s initially prepared mode is given by: V = VS + V0.
We can further decompose the variance of the thermal mode
V0 := V (Xˆ0) into the variance of the pure vacuum mode
(which is normalized to 1) and the variance of the unknown
preparation noise at Alice’s station β to give: V0 = 1+β. Typ-
ically, in CV-QKD protocols, we simply have V = VS+1, i.e.,
zero preparation noise (β = 0). In this paper, we consider the
effect of having non-zero preparation noise on Alice’s mode
preparation, i.e., β > 0. We assume that this preparation noise
cannot be controlled or manipulated by Eve.
In the analysis of CV-QKD protocols, the collective Gaus-
sian attacks [12–14] are the most important. In fact, up to
a suitable symmetrization of the protocols [15], these attacks
bound the most powerful eavesdropping strategy allowed by
quantum mechanics [15]. The most general form of a collec-
tive Gaussian attack is explicitly described in Ref. [14]. This
consists in Eve interacting her (independent) ancilla modes
with Alice and Bob’s mode for each run of the protocol in such
a way to generate a memoryless (one-mode) Gaussian chan-
nel. Eve’s ancillas are then collected in a quantum memory
whose measurement is optimized on Alice and Bob’s classical
communications [14]. For a practical implementation of the
protocols, the most important collective Gaussian attack is the
2one based on the entangling cloner [16] which is exactly the
model considered in our paper. This consists in Eve perfectly
replacing the quantum channel between Alice and Bob with
her own quantum channel where the loss is simulated by a
beamsplitter with transmission T (which ranges in value from
0 to 1). She then creates her ancilla modes which are two-
mode squeezed states [11] (or commonly known as, Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) states), with variance W . The modes
of the EPR beam can be described by the operators Eˆ′′ and
Eˆ. She keeps one mode of the beam Eˆ′′ and injects the other
mode Eˆ into the unused port of the beamsplitter, resulting in
the output mode Eˆ′. Eve then collectively detects all modes
Eˆ′ and Eˆ′′, gathered from each of the runs of the protocol, in
a final coherent measurement. The final stages of the proto-
col consists in Alice and Bob publicly revealing a subset of
their data in order to estimate the channel transmission T and
excess channel noise W [2]. We also assume that Alice and
Bob (and Eve) know the variance of the unknown prepara-
tion noise β in order to properly estimate the channel noise as
opposed to the sum of the channel noise and the preparation
noise. However, the shot to shot displacement due to the ex-
cess preparation noise remains unknown to everyone. In the
final steps of the protocol, Alice and Bob perform a reconcil-
iation protocol (e.g., see [1]) to correct any errors they might
have between them and then finally privacy amplification [2]
to reduce Eve’s knowledge of the key to a negligible, and safe
amount.
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FIG. 1: Secret key rate R◭ versus channel transmission T using re-
verse reconciliation. Increasing the amount of unknown classical
noise on Alice’s preparation modes in CV-QKD. Here the thermal
radiation is increased: V0 = 1, 10, 102, 103 from left to right, where
W = 1 (lossy channel), VS = 105 and V0 = 1 is a pure vacuum
mode.
Reverse Reconciliation - We begin our analysis by first us-
ing the CV-QKD protocol known as reverse reconciliation [4]
which consists in Alice (and Eve) optimally estimating Bob’s
measurement outcomes. We note that the previous analysis
given in [9] also considered thermal state CV-QKD using re-
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate R◮ versus channel transmission T using di-
rect reconciliation. Increasing the amount of unknown classical noise
on Alice’s preparation modes in CV-QKD. Here the thermal radiation
is increased: V0 = 1, 10, 102, 103, 104 from top to bottom, where
W = 1, VS = 10
5
. We find that direct reconciliation does not show
any deterioration in channel loss when excessively large amounts of
preparation noise is added.
verse reconciliation. However, for completeness, we give the
derivation for reverse reconciliation which will be helpful in
calculating the direct reconciliation case and for a compari-
son between the two protocols. The secret key rate R◭ for
reverse reconciliation where Bob uses homodyne detection
is given by R◭ := I(XA : XB) − I(XB : E). Here
I(XA : XB) is called the mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob and defined in terms of the Shannon (or classical)
entropy [17]. The quantum mutual information between Eve
and Bob I(XB : E) is given by the Holevo information [18]
and describes the most amount of information one can extract
from a quantum state.
The secret key rate R◭ can be calculated (see Appendix for
complete derivation) for various values of preparation noise,
i.e., V0 = 1, 10, 100, 1000. The results are plotted in Fig. 1
for a lossy channel (i.e., W = 1 which corresponds to Eve
simply inserting a vacuum state into the unused port of the
beamsplitter). We see that, as expected, the security is de-
pendent on the channel transmission, and starts deteriorating
rapidly as the excess preparation noise is increased. In fact, af-
ter only a modest increase in preparation noise (from V0 = 1
to V0 = 10), the secure region has shrunk to T ≈> 0.89.
Direct Reconciliation - We now turn our attention to an-
other CV-QKD scheme known as direct reconciliation [3].
Direct reconciliation, was the first protocol to show that one
could use Gaussian modulated coherent states to create a se-
cure key. Unlike, reverse reconciliation, this protocol is a
forward-way scheme where Bob (and Eve) are trying to op-
timally estimate the values of Alice’s initial displacements, or
encodings, QA and PA. However, direct reconciliation has
the drawback in its inability to create a secret key when the
3loss is greater than 3 dB. This corresponds to T < 0.5 and
can be intuitively thought of as Eve sharing more common in-
formation with Alice than Bob does. Consequently, reverse
reconciliation (or post-selection [7]) is usually considered the
most practical CV-QKD protocol [19]. However, as we will
see, despite these shortcomings, direct reconciliation offers a
surprising advantage as a potential platform for noise tolerant
short-range QKD.
The secret key rate R◮ for direct reconciliation using ho-
modyne detection is defined as R◮ := I(XA : XB)−I(XA :
E) where I(XA : E) is again the Holevo quantity but now
defined between Eve and Alice. We can now calculate the
subsequent key rates (see Appendix for details). In Fig. 2 we
have plotted the resulting secret key rates for various values
of V0 using W = 1 and VS = 105. We find that direct recon-
ciliation has the amazing feature that as the preparation noise
becomes more and more significant (even up to 104 times that
of the variance of the pure vacuum mode) only the secret key
rate decreases and not the channel transmission. So for any
value of preparation noise the initial starting point is always
T = 0.5 (c.f. reverse reconciliation where modest increases
in noise reduce the secure region close to unity transmission,
i.e., see Fig. 1). The basic physics is that, for T > 0.5, the
presence of quantum noise always gives Alice and Bob a di-
rect information advantage over Eve. Increased preparation
noise reduces this advantage, but it always remains finite. In
contrast, for reverse reconciliation, Alice’s ability to estimate
what Bob received is rapidly compromised by the preparation
noise. This removes their information advantage over Eve.
In Fig. 3 we have a security threshold plot for direct and
reverse reconciliation for W = 1. The solid (blue) curve is
the previous best bound derived using reverse reconciliation
and is given by [9]: β < (1 − T )−1. On the same plot we
have the new direct reconciliation bound which shows a sub-
stantial improvement over the previous reverse reconciliation
bound. Remarkably, we can see how direct reconciliation is
unaffected by the channel transmission once T > 0.5 and is
secure for a minimum of 4 orders of magnitude of preparation
noise. Therefore, it is best to use reverse reconciliation when
T ≤ 0.5 and direct reconciliation when T > 0.5. Addition-
ally, this result is robust to the addition of small amounts of
excess noise on the quantum channel (i.e., W > 1) which
moves the transmission limit slightly over 50% but retains
qualitatively the same behavior as the lossy case [20].
Infrared to Microwave Quantum Cryptography - It is inter-
esting to consider a possible application of our results: wire-
less CV-QKD at infrared to microwave frequencies. Today,
a large number of popular wireless communication technolo-
gies rely on such frequencies to distribute information. Due
to the ubiquitous nature of such devices, their security is of
fundamental importance. Moving to frequencies lower than
optical rules out discrete variable QKD because of the lack
of photon counting capabilities. The problem for CV-QKD
is that operating at lower frequencies at room temperature in-
evitably introduces a significant amount of thermal noise. In
contrast to the previous section, we now consider a simplified
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FIG. 3: Tolerable preparation (classical) excess noise β = V0 − 1
versus channel transmission T for direct and reverse reconciliation
over a lossy channel. The area under the solid (blue) curve indicates
the previous best secure region threshold using reverse reconcilia-
tion [9]. However, for direct reconciliation, after T = 0.5, one can
immediately obtain many orders of magnitude improvement in the
security threshold.
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FIG. 4: Security of quantum cryptography over various electro-
magnetic wave frequencies (at room temperature) as a function of
channel transmission. Moving our way from the infrared spectrum
(430 THz) and into the microwave spectrum (300 GHz). Our results
show that direct reconciliation should be used when channel losses
are less than 50% and reverse reconciliation otherwise. We note that
at each point the same impurity applies to both Alice and Eve with
VS = 10
8
.
wireless communication protocol where both Alice’s prepa-
ration modes and the quantum channel (Eve) are affected by
the thermal background. When considering Eve we assume
that she prepares her attack within a cryostat which allows
her to essentially prepare pure modes away from the effect of
4the background radiation. Then to cover her tracks she adds
known excess noise to her pure states to emulate the thermal
noise of the environment.
In the previous section we showed that direct reconciliation
is significantly more robust against preparation noise than re-
verse reconciliation and is consequently better suited to our
current analysis. Given that, the next step is to calculate
how strong the thermal modes are at particular frequencies
from optical down to the microwave (1 GHz (λ = 30 cm)
to 300 GHz (λ = 1 mm)). To do this we first write the
average photon number n¯ in terms of the quadrature vari-
ance V using n¯ = 〈aˆ†aˆ〉 = (V − 1)/2 =⇒ V = 2n¯ + 1
where we have symmetrized both quadratures, i.e., V :=
V (Qˆ) = V (Pˆ ) and the annihilation operator aˆ is defined
as aˆ = (Qˆ + iPˆ )/2. Secondly, the average photon number
is equal to n¯ = [exp(~ω/kBT ) − 1]−1 [11] and represents
the blackbody radiation spectrum. For example, at room tem-
perature T = 300 K and using a microwave frequency of
ω = 1 GHz we find that the variance of the thermal mode
is V = 7.85 × 104; while at the other end of the microwave
spectrum (ω = 300 GHz) the variance is V = 2.63× 102.
Using the analysis from the previous section, we can calcu-
late the secret key rates using direct reconciliation. In Fig. 4
we plot the security of CV-QKD from the optical frequency
(1550 nm) into the infrared region and down into the mi-
crowave frequency as a function of channel line transmission.
We point out that the secure region corresponds to R > 0.
We find a window of security for CV-QKD throughout all of
the infrared region and into the microwave frequency albeit
with smaller allowed levels of loss. In the mid-infrared re-
gion transmission of T ≈ 0.8 is required whilst in the case
of the microwave region we see that a secure key can only be
generated when the transmission is higher than T ≈ 0.9969.
Nonetheless, it is interesting that a small security window, in
principle, exists. Future analysis will look at improving the
region where infrared and microwave CV-QKD is secure. For
example, in [6] they showed that the security thresholds for
direct reconciliation could be improved (and in fact beat the
3 dB loss limit) if two-way quantum communication was used.
Furthermore, post-selection [7] could also be used to investi-
gate a possible way to combat the high preparation noise.
Conclusion - In conclusion, we have shown that when con-
sidering unknown preparation noise in continuous-variable
QKD, direct reconciliation is significantly more robust than
reverse reconciliation when the channel loss does not exceed
50%. Incredibly, direct reconciliation showed no deterioration
in the loss threshold, only in secret key rates, even when the
variance of the thermal noise is as much as 104 times greater
than that of the pure vacuum mode. Furthermore, we have
shown that infrared to microwave quantum cryptography is,
in principle, possible over short distances when using con-
tinuous variables and opens up the possibility of further av-
enues of investigations. In conclusion, we have shown that
when considering unknown preparation noise in continuous-
variable QKD, direct reconciliation is significantly more ro-
bust than reverse reconciliation when the channel loss does not
exceed 50%. Incredibly, direct reconciliation showed no de-
terioration in the loss threshold, only in secret key rates, even
when the variance of the thermal noise is as much as 104 times
greater than that of the pure vacuum mode. Furthermore, we
have shown that infrared to microwave quantum cryptogra-
phy is, in principle, possible over short distances when using
continuous variables and opens up the possibility of further
avenues of investigations.
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APPENDIX
Introduction to Gaussian Formalisms
Here we introduce some of the Gaussian tools and tech-
niques required for our analysis. Such Gaussian formalisms
can be found elsewhere in the literature typically in the con-
text of quantum information using continuous variables (for
example, see [6, 21–23]). However, in what follows, we give
the reader a self-contained treatment for what is needed to un-
derstand and derive the results given in the main text of the
paper.
To begin with, we can define the quadrature row vector Yˆ,
which describes a bosonic system [24] of n modes, as:
Yˆ = (Qˆ1, Pˆ1, ..., Qˆn, Pˆn), (1)
where Yˆl is the lth element of the vector. This satisfies the
commutator relation:
[Yˆl, Yˆm] = 2iΩlm, (2)
for 1 ≤ l,m,≤ 2n. Here the matrixΩ defines the symplectic
form and is given as
Ω :=
n⊕
k=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (3)
where Ωlm denote the row l and columnm of the matrix, e.g.,
Ω11 is the first row and first column entry of Ω. Firstly, the
notation for the above matrix can be explained with a simple
example. For n = 2 mode case the direct sum
⊕
means that
we form two 2 × 2 block diagonal matrices to create a larger
54× 4 matrix, i.e.,
Ωn=2 :=
2⊕
k=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
=


0 1
−1 0
0 1
−1 0

 , (4)
where the empty spaces indicate zero elements. Secondly, the
compact version of the commutator given in Eq. (2) can now
be understood using the simple case of one mode (n = 1)
where
Ωn=1 :=
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (5)
and Yˆ1 := Qˆ1 and Yˆ2 := Pˆ1 for l,m = 1, 2. Therefore Eq. (2)
is a compact way of saying the following:
[Yˆ1, Yˆ1] = [Qˆ1, Qˆ1] = 2iΩ11 = 0,
[Yˆ1, Yˆ2] = [Qˆ1, Pˆ2] = 2iΩ12 = 2i,
[Yˆ2, Yˆ1] = [Pˆ2, Qˆ1] = 2iΩ21 = −2i, (6)
[Yˆ2, Yˆ2] = [Pˆ2, Pˆ2] = 2iΩ22 = 0.
A Gaussian bosonic state ρ is fully characterized by its dis-
placement
〈Yˆ〉 = Tr(Yˆρ), (7)
and its correlation matrix (CM). The various elements of a
correlation matrix V can be calculated using the following for-
mulas. Firstly, the off-diagonal terms:
Vlm :=
1
2
〈YˆlYˆm + YˆmYˆl〉 − 〈Yˆl〉〈Yˆm〉, (8)
and the diagonal elements:
Vll = 〈Yˆ 2l 〉 − 〈Yˆl〉2 := V (Yˆl). (9)
Qualitatively it means that the diagonal terms contain the vari-
ances whilst the off-diagonal terms contain the correlations.
An example might help here. A simple vacuum state, where
the variance of the quadratures is normalized to one, has a CM
given by
Vvac =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (10)
We can see that the variance of each quadrature is on the diag-
onal, whilst on the off-diagonal we have the zero correlation
(meaning they are independent) terms.
The von Neumann entropy [25]
S(ρ) = −Tr(ρlog2ρ), (11)
of a Gaussian state ρ can be written in terms of its symplectic
eigenvalues νk as [26]
S(ρ) =
n∑
k=1
g(νk), (12)
where
g(ν) :=
(ν + 1
2
)
log2
(ν + 1
2
)
−
(ν − 1
2
)
log2
(ν − 1
2
)
.
(13)
These symplectic eigenvalues can be calculated using the for-
mula
ν = |iΩV|, (14)
where ν ≥ 1. The above notation means that you first find
the eigenvalues of the matrix iΩV and then take the absolute
values. As it turns out these eigenvalues (known also as the
symplectic spectrum) are a powerful tool which allows one to
determine many important features of a Gaussian system. Al-
though Eq. (14) gives one a way of calculating the spectrum,
the output from using such a formula can sometimes lead very
complicated equations. In certain circumstances, we are able
to simplify the calculation of the eigenvalues. Let’s look at
that now. First, consider a generic two-mode CM in block
form
V =
(
A C
C
T
B
)
. (15)
It is known [27] that its symplectic eigenvalues ν1 and ν2 can
be written in the form
ν1,2 =
√
1
2
(
∆±
√
∆2 − 4 detV
)
, (16)
where detV means the determinant of the matrix V and
∆ := detA+ detB+ 2detC. (17)
In particular, let us consider a CM of the form
V =
(
aI
√
TcZ√
TcZ bI
)
, (18)
where c ≥ 0, T ∈ [0, 1] and
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (19)
We can easily verify that detV = (ab − c2T )2 and ∆ =
a2 + b2 − 2c2T . As a consequence, the eigenvalues take the
simple expression
ν1,2 :=
1
2
(√
y ± (a− b)
)
, (20)
where y := (a+ b)2 − 4c2T ≥ 4.
Reverse Reconciliation
The secret key rateR◭ for reverse reconciliation where Bob
uses homodyne detection is given by
R◭ := I(XA : XB)− I(XB : E), (21)
6where I(XA : XB) is known as the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob and I(XB : E) the mutual information
between Bob and Eve. We have a secure key when the key
rate is positive, i.e.,
R > 0. (22)
Another way to think about this is a secure key can be synthe-
sized when Eve has less information than Alice and Bob:
I(XA : XB) > I(XB : E). (23)
We also note that, for Alice and Bob, the variable Xˆ corre-
sponds to either of the two quadratures {Qˆ, Pˆ}, such that
XˆA = {QˆA, PˆA}, (24)
XˆB = {QˆB, PˆB}. (25)
Firstly, let us calculate the mutual information between Alice
and Bob where
I(XA : XB) := H(XB)−H(XB|XA). (26)
Here
H(XB) =
1
2
log2 V (XˆB), (27)
is the Shannon (or classical) entropy and
H(XB|XA) = 1
2
log2 V (XˆB|XA), (28)
is known as the conditional Shannon entropy [17]. To deter-
mine XˆB we set up a generic quantum channel with trans-
mission T ∈ [0, 1] with excess noise Nˆ and model it using a
beamsplitter equation, where the transmitted output (received
by Bob) is given by:
XˆB =
√
TXˆA +
√
1− TNˆ. (29)
The variance of the above equation is given by
V (QˆB) = V (PˆB) = (1− T )W + TV := bV , (30)
where both quadratures have been symmetrized and V (Nˆ) :=
W . Also, the variance of Alice’s modes is given by
V = VS + V0, (31)
where VS is the variance of the initial signal encodings and
V0 is the variance of the vacuum state (see main text for more
detail). In Eq. (28) the conditional variance term V (XˆB|XA)
is derived by setting up an optimal estimator equation (e.g.,
see its use in [6] or [28]):
V (XˆB|XA) = V (XˆB)− |〈XˆBXS〉|
2
V (XS)
, (32)
where specifically here we have XS ∈ {QA, PA} (the signal)
rather than XˆA (signal plus noise) because it is Bob’s estimate
of Alice’s signal not his estimate of both the signal and noise.
Calculating this explicitly we get:
V (QˆB|QA) = V (PˆB |PA) = (1− T )W + TV0 := b1.
(33)
Using Eq. (26) with Eqs. (27) and (28) we calculate Alice and
Bob’s mutual information to be
I(XA : XB) =
1
2
log2
[ (1− T )W + TVS + TV0
(1− T )W + TV0
]
. (34)
We now turn our attention to calculating the mutual infor-
mation between Eve and Bob. This is given by the Holevo
information [18] defined as
I(XB : E) := S(E)− S(E|XB). (35)
In the literature it is also common to use the notation χ for the
Holevo (information) bound (for more background on both
the classical and quantum information formulas, see e.g., [25,
29]).
Here the quantum entropies S(E) := S(ρE) and S(E|XB)
are found by calculating the eigenvalues, or symplectic spec-
trum ν, of their corresponding CMs: VE and VE|XB , respec-
tively. Eve’s CM is made up from the two modes Eˆ′ and Eˆ′′
(see main text for details) and is given by
VE(V, V ) =
(
∆[eV , eV ] ϕZ
ϕZ W I
)
, (36)
where
eV := (1 − T )V + TW, (37)
and the notation ∆[·, ·] simply means a diagonal matrix with
the arguments [·, ·] on the diagonal entries and also
ϕ = [T (W 2 − 1)]1/2. (38)
Eve’s symplectic spectra can be determined by using Eq. (20)
νE =
1
2
[
√
(eV +W )2 − 4T (W 2 − 1)± (eV −W )]. (39)
Eve’s conditional CM is given by
VE|XB = VE − (βV )−1CΠCT , (40)
where VE is defined in Eq. (36) and
Π :=
(
1 0
0 0
)
. (41)
Furthermore, C is a 4× 2 matrix describing the quantum cor-
relations between Eve’s modes {Eˆ′, Eˆ′′} and Bob’s output
mode XˆB and is defined as
C :=
(
〈Eˆ′XˆB〉I
〈Eˆ′′XˆB〉Z
)
=
(
ξI
φZ
)
, (42)
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ξ = −
√
T (1− T )(VS + V0 −W ), (43)
and
φ =
√
1− T
√
W 2 − 1, (44)
and we have used
XˆB =
√
TXˆA +
√
1− TEˆ, (45)
and
Eˆ′ = −
√
1− TXˆA +
√
TEˆ. (46)
Using the above we find that Eve’s conditional CM VE|XB
has the form
VE|XB =
(
A C
C
T
B
)
, (47)
where
A =
(
V W
T (V−W )+W 0
0 (1− T )V + TW
)
, (48)
B =
(
1−T+TWV
TV +W−TW 0
0 W
)
,
C =
( √
T (W 2 − 1)
[
V
TV +W−TW
]
0
0 −
√
T (W 2 − 1)
)
.
Using Eq. (16) the corresponding symplectic spectra νE|XB
of VE|XB can be calculated. The final secret key rate R◭
can now be calculated numerically, using Eq. (21) with the
appropriate formulas, for various values of preparation noise.
Direct Reconciliation
The secret key rate R◮ for direct reconciliation using ho-
modyne detection is given by
R◮ := I(XA : XB)− I(XA : E), (49)
where I(XA : XB) has already been calculated in Eq. (34).
For Eve, we have
I(XA : E) := S(E)− S(E|XA), (50)
where again we have already calculated S(E) previously and
S(E|XA) is calculated from the spectrum of the conditional
CM VE|XA . Eve’s conditional CM for homodyne detection
using direct reconciliation is equal to
VE|QA = VE(V0, V ), (51)
where VE is defined in Eq. (36). Using Eq. (14) the corre-
sponding symplectic spectra νE|XA is:
νE|XA =
1√
2
(√
|F ±
√
G|
)
(52)
where
F = V V0 + T (2 + (T − 2)V V0)− TW (T − 1)(V + V0)
+W 2(T − 1)2, (53)
and
G = (T − 1)2(T 2(V −W )2(V0 −W )2 + (−V0V +W 2)2
+ 2T (V −W )(W − V0)(−2 + V V0 +W 2)). (54)
The final secret key rate R◮ can now be calculated numeri-
cally, using Eq. (49) with the appropriate formulas, for various
values of preparation noise.
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